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1123 
STINGRAYS, TRIGGERFISH, AND HAILSTORMS, OH MY! 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE 




Since as early as its interpretation in Katz v. United States,1 the 
Fourth Amendment has protected the privacy rights of individuals in 
situations where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.2  This 
finding was based on a narrow reading of the Fourth Amendment’s 
own language, which provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.3 
However, emerging technology has undoubtedly called into 
question what was assumed to be an almost indelible protection of an 
 
*Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2018; Siena College, B.A., in 
English, minor in Writing and Communications, 2009.  I would like to give a special thanks 
to my advisor, the Honorable Mark Cohen, for his inspiration, insight, and overwhelming 
confidence in my abilities throughout this process.  I also owe gratitude to my parents, brother, 
and sister for their never-ending patience and encouragement while I work to achieve all of 
my law school aspirations.  Thank you to all of my friends for their support in this endeavor, 
especially my lifelong friend, Kristin Sheridan, who provides nothing but endless love and 
laughs.  Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my note editor, Jessica Vogele, for 
her guidance every step of the way—I could not have had a better role model. 
1 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
2 Christopher D. Browne, Ill-Suited to the Digital Age: Problems with Emerging Judicial 
Perspectives on Warrantless Searches of Cell Site Location Information, 4 NW. 
INTERDISCIPLINARY L. REV. 57, 83-84 (2013). 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
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individual’s privacy interests.  In 2001, the United States Supreme 
Court recognized in Kyllo v. United States4 that “[i]t would be foolish 
to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth 
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of 
technology.”5  Yet, since Kyllo was decided, the amount of available 
technology has only grown, with the technology information business 
expected to become a $547 billion industry in 2017.6  Consistent with 
the findings of the Supreme Court in Kyllo,7 and particularly the late 
Justice Anton Scalia,8 it is clear that this quickly-advancing technology 
has made it increasingly difficult for the Court to keep up with its 
potential constitutional implications.  Now with the emergence of 
advanced surveillance equipment, it has become judicially and 
statutorily unclear as to what degree this technology either eliminates 
or reduces such expectations of privacy, especially with respect to 
cellular telephone devices.9   
Today, cellular and mobile devices have become the primary 
platform for communication,10 financial transactions,11 political 
 
4 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001). 
5 Id. at 34. 
6 2017 Technology, Media, and Telecommunications Predictions Infographics, DELOITTE 
GLOBAL, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Technology-
Media-Telecommunications/gx-deloitte-2017-tmt-predictions-infographics.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2017). 
7 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
8 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he Katz test 
rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and 
stable set of privacy expectations.  But technology can change those expectations.  Dramatic 
technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may 
ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.  New technology may provide 
increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the 
tradeoff worthwhile.  And even if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that 
new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as 
inevitable.”). 
9 This is based on the unanswered question as to whether an individual whose use of a 
device which knowingly transmits information through third-party wireless carriers actually 
has a reasonable expectation that the transmissions will remain private. 
10 See Facts and Infographics Archive, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/resource-library/facts-
and-infographics/archive/infographic-smartphones-comprise-77-percent-of-traffic-on-
wireless-networks (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (indicating that 56.6% of device connections in 
North America come from smartphones); Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-
use-in-2015/ (indicating that 67% of smartphone users use their phones to share pictures, 
videos, or commentary about community events).   
11 See Facts and Infographics Archive, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/industry-data/facts-and-
infographics-details/fact-and-infographics/98-percent-of-visit-growth-in-e-commerce-from-
smartphones (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (indicating that “[s]martphones account for 98% of 
2
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information,12 content streaming,13 and location services.14  Since 
cellular technology has become a ubiquitous force in the function of 
today’s society, it is of no surprise that local police and federal 
agencies have also attempted to take advantage of society’s reliance on 
these devices by using them as an investigatory assistance tool to help 
establish the location of victims, fugitives, criminals, and terrorists.15  
With the development of military-type technology, federal and state 
police agencies have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on cell-
site simulator equipment that can be used to manipulate radio-
frequency transmissions from cellular phone towers to give police an 
identified target’s cellular location.16  The most technologically-
advanced versions of these simulators, devices known primarily as a 
StingRays, Triggerfish, or Hailstorms, have been used by numerous 
local and federal government agencies to obtain information from all 
 
the growth in digital commerce site visits worldwide”); Facts and Infographic Archives, 
CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/industry-data/facts-and-infographics-details/fact-and-
infographics/more-than-one-quarter-of-millennials-prefer-shopping-via-smartphone (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2017) (indicating that 28% of millennials in the United States alone “prefer 
shopping on their smartphones than on their computers”); Smith, supra note 10 (indicating 
that 57% of wireless users use their phones for wireless banking). 
12 See Facts and Infographics Archive, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/resource-library/facts-
and-infographics/archive/infographic-voters-increasingly-use-smartphones-for-political-info 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (indicating that in 2014, approximately 28% of voters used their 
cellular smart devices for political information, more than double the amount in 2010); Smith, 
supra note 10 (indicating that 40% of cellular uses use their devices to look up government 
services or information). 
13 See Facts and Infographics Archive, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/industry-data/facts-and-
infographics-details/fact-and-infographics/young-adults-spend-more-than-11-hours-per-
week-streaming-via-smartphones (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (indicating that those between 
the ages of 18-24 spend more than 11 hours per week streaming content from their mobile 
phones); Facts and Infographics Archive, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/resource-library/facts-
and-infographics/archive/infographic-more-than-half-of-digital-video-views-will-be-on-
mobile-next-year (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (indicating that over 52% of all digital worldwide 
video views in 2016 will be from mobile devices). 
14 See Facts and Infographics Archive, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/industry-data/facts-and-
infographics-details/fact-and-infographics/73-percent-of-millennials-use-smartphone-when-
lost (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (indicating that 73% of millennials first turn to their cellular 
telephones when getting lost as opposed to utilizing other means); Smith, supra note 10 
(indicating that 67% of smartphone users use their phone for “turn-by-turn navigation while 
driving,” with 25% using their phone to obtain public transit information, and 11% using their 
phones “at least occasionally to reserve a car or taxi service.”). 
15 See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location 
Info. on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
16 In Support of a Warrant Requirement for the Use of StingRays, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES 
UNION, https://www.nyclu.org/en/legislation/support-warrant-requirement-use-stingrays (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2017). 
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surrounding cellular devices in order to locate their targets.17  Once the 
target is discovered, the police are able to surveil with real-time 
tracking, leading them to the target’s almost precise location without 
wasting valuable police time and resources.18 
However, many have recognized that the ability of state and 
local governments to freely use such technology to their advantage 
does not come without potential Fourth Amendment implications.19  In 
fact, few statutory and common law principles currently stand in the 
way of the government’s ability to use and therefore potentially abuse 
these devices.20  Similarly, minimal, if any, court approval is needed 
to authorize their use.21  
Though initial use of this technology had previously evaded 
court intervention for quite some time,22 jurisdictions are currently 
split as to how the benefits of this technology can still be used without 
violation of an individual’s privacy rights.23  Some authorities have 
required that agencies establish the minimal criteria needed for a pen-
register/trap-trace warrant24 before cell-site location data can be 
obtained through the use of a cell-site simulator.25  Contrarily, some 
courts have placed a much heavier burden on the proponent, requiring 
that they establish sufficient probable cause26 prior to its legal use.27  
 
17 See id. 
18 Id. 
19 See, e.g., Brian L. Owsley, TriggerFish, StingRays, and Fourth Amendment Fishing 
Expeditions, 66 HASTINGS L. J. 183 (2014); Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your 
Secret StingRay’s No Secret Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell Phone 
Surveillance and Its Impact on National Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. L. J. OF 
TECH. 1 (2014). 
20 Browne, supra note 2, at 57. 
21 Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More Than a Pen Register, and Less 
Than a Wiretap: What the StingRay Teaches Us About How Congress Should Approach the 
Reform of Law Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 16 YALE L.J. & TECH. 134, 142 (2013). 
22 Browne, supra note 2, at 57. 
23 Christopher Izant, Note, Stingray Surveillance: Legal Rules by Statute or Subsumption?, 
HARV. L. SCH. NAT’L SEC. J. (July 15, 2016 at 10:32 PM), 
http://harvardnsj.org/2016/07/stingray-surveillance-legal-rules-by-statute-or-subsumption/. 
24 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) (2012) (indicating what the contents of an application for a 
pen/register warrant must include). 
25 Izant, supra note 23. 
26 As a primarily judicial construct, “probable cause” has no statutory definition; however, 
the United States Supreme Court has indicated that it requires belief that the condition 
precedent to the execution of a search warrant will occur and that, once it has, “there is a fair 
probability that the contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a specified place.”  U.S. 
v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). 
27 Izant, supra note 23. 
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However, without any governing standard upon which to rely, the 
potential ongoing violation of individual privacy rights remains high 
with the continuing use of this technology. 
Accordingly, this Note attempts to provide an accurate road 
map of the various types of information concerning cell-site simulator 
use and how its implications on Fourth Amendment rights call for the 
establishment of a sufficient probable cause warrant prior to its use.  
Section II will outline the basic technology behind the functionality of 
cellular telephones.  This information is vital to the understanding of 
the concepts discussed in Section III, the basic functionality of cell-
site simulator devices, more commonly known as StingRays, 
Triggerfish, or Hailstorms.  Section III will also delve into the 
developments, costs, and frequency of use of such devices on a 
national spectrum.  
Section IV will discuss the changes in the interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution over time and how this “right 
to be left alone” has transformed with the progressions in new 
technology.  Relatedly, Section V will address Congress’s past and 
present attempts at providing guidance for the advancements in 
electronic surveillance equipment.  As examined therein, it was not 
until a few years ago that the legality of cell-site simulators was even 
discussed, despite reports indicating their use by government agencies 
for several years prior.28  While Section V will discuss the 
inadequacies of the law in regulating cell-site simulators, Section VI 
will document the strongest argument against the need for even 
minimal regulation of these devices—the third-party disclosure 
doctrine.  This doctrine relies upon an individual’s voluntary 
relinquishment of his privacy rights to third parties, which proponents 
argue occurs upon the signing of a cellular contract.29  Section VII will 
analyze how the lower courts have interpreted the impact of the use of 
cell-site simulators on Fourth Amendment rights and therefore will 
provide a brief discussion of the current common law on this subject.   
Finally, Section VIII will provide an overall analysis on this 
subject and how a Supreme Court decision on the quantum of proof 
necessary for the authorization of use of a cell-site simulator is 
desperately needed to provide the lower courts with reliable precedent.  
Nonetheless, because most cases and agency procedure guidelines 
 
28 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 21, at 143. 
29 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
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discussed herein seem to reflect the conclusion that cell-site simulators 
have a strong tendency to implicate an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights, often inadvertently by the very nature of their functionality, it 
seems likely that the Supreme Court would resolve the jurisdictional 
splits by requiring that any potential user establish probable cause to 
justify such an intrusive invasion into an individual’s private life. 
II. BASIC CELLULAR PHONE FUNCTIONALITY 
At the most basic level, a cellular phone is best described as a 
“short-range radio transmitter”30 that has the capability of making and 
receiving calls through the transmission of radio frequencies to 
“cellular base stations” or “cell sites”31 on cellular network towers32 
(“cell towers”) generally located within three to 15 miles33 from the 
cellular device.  Upon receipt of these transmissions, the cell tower 
then transmits or “pings” this signal to other cell towers within the 
service provider’s network until it becomes in range of the recipient of 
the call.34  Therefore, in order for the radio frequency to transmit to the 
intended recipient, it must weave a path between the caller and the 
recipient by bouncing back and forth between the network’s cell 
towers.35  To ensure the strongest signal between the caller and the 
intended recipient, cell phones are able to locate the closest cell towers 
 
30 Browne, supra note 2, at 61. 
31 Owsley, supra note 19, at 187-88 (indicating that cell sites are usually placed “atop 
towers, but the equipment can also be placed on trees, roofs, flagpoles, and buildings.”). 
32 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a 
Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (indicating that 
individual cellular towers within a network can be anywhere from miles apart (more common 
in less populated rural areas) to several hundred feet apart (more common in more highly 
populated areas)). 
33 Browne, supra note 2, at 61-62. 
34 Browne, supra note 2, at 62. 
35 The path which cell phone signals take is best exemplified by the following: 
When a caller dials a number on a cellular telephone, a transceiver sends 
signals over the air on a radiofrequency to a cell site.  From there the signal 
travels over phone lines or a microwave to a computerized mobile 
telephone switching office (“MTSO”) or station.  The MTSO 
automatically and inaudibly switches the conversation from one base 
station and one frequency to another as the portable telephone moves from 
cell to cell.  
Owsley, supra note 19, at 188.  
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by sending automatic signals in a procedure known as “registration.”36  
This process finds the strongest signal by forcing the cellular phone to 
“identif[y] the closest tower, and ensure[] that calls sent to and 
received by the phone will be routed through that tower . . . .”37  
This registration process occurs repeatedly every seven 
seconds as long as the cellular device is turned on38 and cannot be 
controlled at the discretion of the cellular user.39  It also permits the 
cellular device to be identified through a series of identification 
numbers40 and allows the service providers “to create and maintain a 
record of every cell tower with which each phone on their networks 
has registered, and when each of those registrations happened.”41  This 
collected data stored by the cellular service provider is more 
commonly known as cell-site location information (“CLSI”).42  
Through the collection of CLSI, the cellular service provider has the 
means to identify the location of a cellular user at any given time 
through monitoring of the registration process.43  While cellular 
 
36 Owsley, supra note 19, at 188; Pell & Soghoian, supra note 21, at 144.  The United States 
Department of Justice, via an Electronic Surveillance Manual, describes the registration 
procedure as follows: 
Cellular telephones that are powered on will automatically register or re-
register with a cellular tower as the phone travels within the provider’s 
service area.  The registration process is the technical means by which the 
network identifies the subscriber, validates the account and determines 
where to route call traffic.  This exchange occurs on a dedicated control 
channel that is clearly separate from that used for call content (i.e. audio) 
— which occurs on a separate dedicated channel. 
Electronic Surveillance Manual: Procedures and Case Law Forms, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 178-
79 n.41 (rev. June 2005), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/docs/elec-sur-manual.pdf. 
37 Browne, supra note 2, at 62.  
38 Browne, supra note 2, at 62. 
39 Electronic Surveillance Manual, supra note 36, at 40. 
40 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Auth. the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and 
Trace Device and Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 
2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“[T]hese codes include an Electronic Serial Number (a unique 
32-bit number programmed into the phone by the manufacturer), and a Mobile Identification 
Number, a 10-digit number derived from the phone’s number.”).   
41 Browne, supra note 2, at 62-63.  The Department of Justice’s Electronic Service Manual 
indicates that the collection of this data is necessary to “provide service to cellular telephones.”  
Electronic Surveillance Manual, supra note 36, at 42. 
42 Browne, supra note 2, at 63. 
43 Browne, supra note 2, at 63 (indicating that the registration process allows a network 
carrier “to pinpoint the location of a cell phone by cross-referencing the location of the cell 
tower with which the phone registered, at the time at which the registration occurred.  Using 
this information, a cell phone service provider can determine the location of a cell phone, and 
by implication its user, at virtually any point in time . . . .”).  See also In re Application of the 
U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 
7
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carriers claim that the collection of such data is primarily used by 
network service providers for billing purposes,44 use of this 
information leaves the carrier able to identify a cellular device within 
an isolated range of the nearest cell tower,45 the accuracy of which 
increases with the growing use of smart phone technology and the 
installation of more cell towers by service providers.46 
III. CELL-SITE SIMULATORS:                                                  
DEVELOPMENTS, COSTS, AND USAGE 
Cell-site simulators, otherwise known as International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (“IMSI”) catchers, are the government’s most 
widely used “spy” tools to track cellular phone activity.47  The concept 
was first invented by a German manufacturing company known as 
Rohde & Schwarz in 1996 when it created a machine that forced 
cellular devices within range to identify their own serial numbers for 
surveillance purposes.48  However, the technology behind this concept 
quickly advanced as the United States government, military agencies, 
and intelligence agencies helped in making these devices more 
refined.49  In just a few years, the Harris Corporation, a Florida-based 
 
460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Knowledge of the locations of multiple towers 
receiving signals from a particular telephone at a given moment permits the determination, by 
simple mathematics, of the location of the telephone with a fair degree of precision through 
the long established process known as triangulation.”); Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 12-
13 (indicating that the service provider is not only able to pinpoint the phone’s location, but 
also numbers recently called and other personal data). 
44 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a 
Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (indicating that this information is 
generally used to determine whether roaming charges apply or to track call volume to 
determine the need for more cell towers). 
45 Id. at 450-51 (stating that in some cases the closest tower receiving the signal from a 
cellular device can pinpoint not only the range of the device from the tower, but also “in which 
of the three 120-degree arcs of the 360-degree circle surrounding the tower the particular 
phone is located.”); Browne, supra note 2, at 64 (indicating that this degree of accuracy can 
be up to a 200-foot range, which is enough to determine a cell phone user’s location in “a 
building or other residence”). 
46 Browne, supra note 2, at 64. 
47 See generally Electronic Surveillance Manual, supra note 36; Pell & Soghoian, supra 
note 21.  
48 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 13-14 (citing Dirk Fox, IMSI-Catcher, 21 
DATENSCHUTZ UND DATENSICHERHEIT 539, 539 (1997)). 
49 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 14. 
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 3, Art. 18
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/18
2017 CELL SITE SIMULATORS  1131 
manufacturer,50 exclusively developed, and continues to develop,51 
more sophisticated cell-simulator devices, including Triggerfish, and 
the most commonly-known and technologically advanced version, the 
StingRay machine.52   
Still, little is known about the specifics behind the development 
of these highly technical machines outside of what is minimally 
provided by patent and trademark registration information53 and 
Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”) requests made by advocates 
against the use of cell-site devices to numerous police departments and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”).54  For example, purchase 
orders released in response to these FOIL requests fail to indicate 
anything more than the fact that these machines were purchased from 
the Harris Corporation at relatively high prices.55  However, what is 
 
50 According to the Harris Corporation’s website, it specializes in the manufacture of 
“tactical communications, geospatial systems and services, air traffic management, 
environmental solutions, avionics and electronic warfare, and space and intelligence.” About 
Harris, HARRIS TECHNOLOGY, https://www.harris.com/about (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).  
51 Ryan Gallagher, Law & Disorder: Meet the Machines that Steal Your Phone’s Data, ARS 
TECHNICA (Sept. 25, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/meet-the-
machines-that-steal-your-phones-data/. 
52 See W. Scott Kim, Note, The Fourth Amendment Implications on the Real-Time Tracking 
of Cell Phones Through the Use of “Stingrays,” 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. 
L. J. 995, 1001 (2016) (indicating that the Patent and Trademark Office reveals that the name 
StingRay was registered as a trademark in 2003 by the Harris Corporation); Pell & Soghoian, 
supra note 19, at 14-15; Gallagher, supra note 51 (indicating that trademark information for 
the first StingRay machine was filed by Harris Corporation in August 2001); Stingrays, N.Y. 
CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/stingrays (last visited Mar. 18, 2017). 
53 Gallagher, supra note 51.  In fact, the Harris Corporation website itself does not indicate 
to the public that it manufactures such equipment.  Kim, supra note 52, at 1000. 
54 See Stingrays, supra note 52 (discussing FOIL requests made to the Erie County Sheriff’s 
Office, Rochester Sheriff’s Department, and the New York State Police in 2015). 
55 The New York Civil Liberties Union website indicates that in May 2014, the New York 
State Police released purchase orders which revealed that they had paid $197,100 to obtain a 
StingRay device in 2005, as well as a total of $263,230 to maintain and upgrade equipment 
and provide training for StingRay machines in 2012, which increased in 2013 by $181,174.  
This revealed that the New York State Police had spent at least $651,504 on this StingRay 
machine.  Also, in May 2016, the Rochester Police Department produced information that they 
purchased a StingRay machine known as “KingFish” from the Harris Corporation in June of 
2015.  The information further provides that KingFish is able to be attached to department 
vehicles to identify and track cellular devices and costs the Rochester New York Police 
Department approximately $200,600 for hardware, software, and training on use of the device.  
The website also suggests that such hardware would likely cost the Rochester Police 
Department additional thousands of dollars to be used for yearly maintenance fees with the 
Harris Corporation in order to keep the cell-site simulator operational. In particular, one record 
revealed that the Harris Corporation informed the Rochester Police Department that it had to 
upgrade its KingFish unit to the Hailstorm unit to keep its technology operational for a cost of 
$388,000.  See Stingrays, supra note 52. 
9
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known is that the Harris Corporation has earned approximately $40 
million from technology contracts with local city and state police 
authorities in providing cell-site simulator equipment.56  Based on the 
availability of procurement records, federal authorities alone have 
been noted to spend over $30 million on cell-site simulator equipment 
since 2004.57  However, most authorities show that the funding for 
such machines comes from the federal government through anti-terror 
grants.58 
StingRay machines have been described as “box-shaped 
portable device[s],” which function by impersonating cellular base 
stations59 and deceiving any nearby cellular devices into thinking that 
they are connecting to a cellular tower.60  The portability of the device 
is important to its function, as it can be set up anywhere, even in 
moving vehicles.61  Accordingly, these devices can be easily moved to 
more accurately pinpoint the location of a cellular device user in real 
time.62   
Though police agencies admit that use of these devices is an 
essential investigatory tool that provides “important crime-fighting 
and surveillance techniques”63 that can “help solve crimes, track 
fugitives or abducted children or even foil a terror attack,”64 the 
information obtained from a StingRay is not narrowly limited to the 
subject of the agency’s search.65  Contrarily, StingRay devices are 
known to force all cell phones in the area of the cell tower to send their 
 
56 Gallagher, supra note 51. 
57 Gallagher, supra note 51. 
58 John Kelly, Cellphone Data Spying: It’s Not Just the NSA, USA TODAY, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/08/cellphone-data-spying-nsa-
police/3902809/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2017). 
59 Gallagher, supra note 51. 
60 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 11; Gallagher, supra note 51. 
61 Gallagher, supra note 51. 
62 Ryan Gallagher, FBI Accused of Dragging Feet on Release of Info About “Stingray” 
Surveillance Technology, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Oct. 19, 2012, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/10/19/stingray_imsi_fbi_accused_by_epic_of
_dragging_feet_on_releasing_documents.html. 
63 Kelly, supra note 58.  
64 Kelly, supra note 58. 
65 Proposed Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Daniel Rigmaiden’s Motion to Suppress at 
1, 3, United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800 (No. 904-3), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/rigmaiden_amicus.pdf (referring to such a search as a 
“dragnet sweep” and indicating that in “locat[ing] a suspect’s cell phone, [S]ting[R]ays obtain 
information from all devices on the same network in a given area and send signals into the 
homes, bags, or pockets of the suspect and third parties alike.”). Kim, supra note 52, at 997. 
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identification information to the device.66  Since the machine is only 
able to detect a particular cellular phone’s identification once it 
registers with a network, the device must search and collect 
information from every in-range cellular device before it can actually 
pinpoint the targeted user.67  Some upgrades to the StingRay machines 
make their functionality even more intrusive—software upgrade 
“FishHawk” allows users to listen to conversations without the cellular 
user’s knowledge, while the “Porpoise” upgrade can be installed to 
provide dual-functionality for surveillance of both location and 
incoming and outgoing text messages.68 
As reported by the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), 
at least 68 agencies in 23 different states have admitted to owning at 
least one cell-site simulator.69  The New York Police Department, the 
biggest municipal police department in the nation, is claimed to have 
used cell-phone tracking devices at least 1,000 times since 2008, or as 
frequently as 200 times per year, all the while avoiding any judicial 
guidance as to the constitutionality of its use due to the lack of 
requirements.70  In Erie County, New York, reports reveal that the 
Sheriff’s Office had utilized cell-site simulator technology 
approximately 47 times during investigations over the last four years, 
while only once obtaining a minimum degree of judicial approval 
before using the equipment.71  On a federal level, agencies known to 
use cell-site simulation technology include the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”); the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(“DEA”); the United States Secret Service; the Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement; the United States Marshals Service; the Bureau 
 
66 Proposed Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 65, at 8, 10. 
67 Izant, supra note 23.  
68 Gallagher, supra note 51. 
69 Such states are noted to include Alaska, Arizona, California, District of Columbia, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.  Other states continue to conceal whether they use cell-
site simulator technology for investigative purposes and whether there is any judicial approval 
prior to their use of the machines.  Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, AM. CIV. 
LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2017).  
70 Joseph Goldstein, New York Police Are Using Covert Cellphone Trackers, Civil Liberties 
Group Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/nyregion/new-
york-police-dept-cellphone-tracking-stingrays.html. 
71 NYPD Has Used Stingrays More Than 1,000 Times Since 2008, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES 
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of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the Internal Revenue 
Service; the United States Army; the United States Navy; the United 
States Marine Corps; the United States National Guard; the United 
States Special Operations Command; and the National Security 
Agency.72 
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE 
A. Early Interpretations of the Fourth Amendment 
While the Fourth Amendment explicitly states that “[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,”73 
this seemingly simple and unequivocal statement of rights has 
triggered “[o]ver a century of jurisprudential uncertainty.”74  Though 
the scope and application of the Fourth Amendment has changed 
considerably over time, with this uncertainty being such a significant 
part of the history of the Fourth Amendment, it is no surprise that the 
modern advancements in technology continue to frustrate the 
application of the Fourth Amendment.75 
Initially, the Supreme Court had interpreted the context of the 
Fourth Amendment to be a mere extension of an individual’s property 
rights, based on the concept that, sans technology, both physical 
trespass and intrusion had to occur for a government agent to actually 
conduct a search.76  As a result, the Supreme Court held that Fourth 
Amendment rights were only implicated during actual physical 
intrusion of an individual’s private property.77  However, the Supreme 
Court shifted its application after deciding United States v. Katz, in 
 
72 Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, supra note 70. 
73 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
74 Will Stancil, Note, Warrantless Search Cases Are Really All the Same, 97 MINN. L. R. 
337, 339 (2012). 
75 Id. (“Over a century of jurisprudential uncertainty has stemmed from warring 
interpretations of those twenty-four words.”). 
76 Id. at 340-41. 
77 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (as the seminal case to initially 
determine that Fourth Amendment protection stemmed from property interests). Further, 
compare Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1942) (holding that a monitoring 
device placed against the wall of a private residence was not unlawful) with Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961) (holding that police surveillance violated Fourth 
Amendment rights of the defendant when evidence was obtained upon use of a device that was 
physically driven into the wall).  
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which it found that the Fourth Amendment did not protect property or 
places but instead protected people.78  Therefore, any person who had 
a “justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate” expectation of privacy which 
was annexed by government action would have standing to claim a 
Fourth Amendment violation.79  Under Katz, physical trespass of 
property was no longer the only means under which one could claim a 
Fourth Amendment violation,80 forcing the Court to subsequently 
define the circumstances that would prompt a “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” in order to comply with the Katz test.  While cases were 
determined on a fact-specific basis, it was generally held that 
reasonable expectations of privacy did not exist in situations where 
someone had voluntarily made otherwise private details available for 
public knowledge,81 or in areas where little, if any, intimate activities 
took place.82  However, while this is easily applied to the 
aforementioned situations, the courts struggled with the introduction 
of modern technology and how it complied with the Katz test. 
B. The Fourth Amendment as Applied to New 
Technology 
Of all of the Court’s cases which confronted the use of new 
technology, Kyllo v. United States83 is certainly one of the most 
influential, since its holding broadly applied Fourth Amendment 
protections to emerging surveillance equipment.84  Evaluating whether 
or not the use of a thermal imaging device to read heatwaves from the 
interior of defendant’s home constituted an unreasonable search in 
 
78 United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
79 Id. at 352 (indicating that a person who enters a telephone booth, though within public 
view, is still a person protected by the Fourth Amendment so long as he has an objective 
reasonable belief and assumption “that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be 
broadcast to the world.”). 
80 Id. at 352-53. 
81 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that an individual had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in performing illegal activities in an area that was commonly 
and easily visible from the air); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding that a 
police search of garbage left on the street was not in violation of an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment rights). 
82 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (holding that an open field was not 
intended to be protected from government intrusion under the Fourth Amendment because it 
does “not provide the setting for . . . intimate activities . . .”). 
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violation of the Fourth Amendment,85 the Court held that an individual 
has an indelible, and therefore reasonable, expectation of privacy 
within the four walls of the home, and the information that was 
obtained by the use of the thermal imaging device, though not obtained 
by physical means, still constituted an unreasonable intrusion because 
the information could not have been obtained otherwise.86  Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, indicated that the Fourth Amendment 
was not constricted by technological advancements, especially when 
these advancements intruded into the most protected area of private 
property— the four walls of the home.87  However, Justice Stevens, 
joined by Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy, wrote in the dissent 
that the only actual intrusion into the home was heat, and given that 
heat could be just as easily sensed by any member of the public from 
outside the home as it could from a thermal imaging device, an 
individual would have no reasonable expectation of privacy against 
it.88  Had the Court utilized the overly simplistic rationale of the 
dissent, arguably any use of modern surveillance technology would 
pose no reasonable threat against an individual’s perception of privacy 
because anyone from the general public could technically observe 
one’s location. 
The Court subsequently addressed a technological 
advancement similar to cell-site simulators in United States v. Knotts.89  
In Knotts, the Court set out to determine whether the use of location 
technology constrained the protections provided by the Fourth 
Amendment.90  The Court held that police reliance on a beeper’s signal 
to track the final destination of defendant’s vehicle did not violate the 
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy,91 relying on the concept 
that an individual “traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one 
 
85 Id. at 29. 
86 Id. at 35-39, 40. 
87 Id. at 33-34. 
88 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 42-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Any member of the public might 
notice that one part of a house is warmer than another part or a nearby building if, for example, 
rainwater evaporates or snow melts at different rates across its surfaces.  Such use of the senses 
would not convert into an unreasonable search if, instead, an adjoining neighbor allowed an 
officer onto her property to verify her perceptions with a sensitive thermometer.”). 
89 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
90 Id. at 277. 
91 Id. at 284-85. 
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place to another.”92  The Court reasoned that such information was not 
private and could have easily been gathered by simple observation.93  
Due to the obvious lack of intrusion involved in obtaining information 
made public versus that obtained from the interior of a home, the most 
private and protected of locations, it is clear why the Court ruled 
differently in Knotts than it did in Kyllo.  
Contrarily, in deciding United States v. Karo,94 the Court held 
that location surveillance equipment placed into a can of chemicals to 
monitor the movement of the container in connection with potential 
drug trafficking did pose a Fourth Amendment violation.95  In this 
case, the DEA learned that the defendant had ordered 50 gallons of 
ether from a government informant to extract cocaine from clothing 
that had been trafficked into the United States.96  In response, the DEA 
planted a location-tracking device in one of the cans of ether that it 
delivered to the defendant.97  Using the tracking device to follow the 
location of the ether, the DEA traced the signal to many locations, one 
of which was the defendant’s own residence.98  In contrast to the facts 
of Knotts, the government’s device in Karo was able to track the 
defendant’s movements inside the walls of his own home which could 
not have been obtained through simple visual observance.99  As a 
result, the Court ruled that this was an unreasonable intrusion.100 
With the development of more precise location technology, the 
Supreme Court was once again forced to address technology’s impact 
on Fourth Amendment rights in United States v. Jones.101  Here, the 
Court addressed the government’s placement of a global-positioning 
(“GPS”) tracking device to the undercarriage of the defendant’s 
vehicle.102  Using this device, the government was able to monitor the 
defendant’s whereabouts for a total of 28 days on suspicion of drug 
 
92 Id. at 276. 
93 Id. 
94 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
95 Id. at 706. 
96 Id. at 708. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 709. 
99 Karo, 468 U.S. at 715 (contrasting this case with United States v. Knotts in that the 
information obtained here was not something that could have been “visually verified”). 
100 Id. at 718. 
101 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
102 Id. at 402. 
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trafficking.103  In holding that this GPS tracking constituted an 
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment,104 the Court 
asserted that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test did not 
substitute the Fourth Amendment rights for common law trespass, but 
merely added to them.105  More simply put, although the Court had 
previously indicated that physical intrusion and trespass of property 
were required for a search to have actually occurred,106 the decision in 
Jones broadened the list of activities which constituted a search within 
the context of the Fourth Amendment.107  In light of this, the 
concurrence found that the defendant did have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his public whereabouts when under long-
term monitoring by the government.108  Specifically, Justice 
Sotomayor conceded that the concept of location tracking in general 
threatened an individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy:  
GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive 
record of a person’s public movements that reflects a 
wealth of detail about her familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations . . . .  
 
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills 
associational and expressive freedoms.  And the 
Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that 
reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse. 
The net result is that GPS monitoring—by making 
available at a relatively low cost such a substantial 
quantum of intimate information about any person 
whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, 
chooses to track—may alter the relationship between 
citizen and government in a way that it is inimical to 
democratic society.  
 
 
103 Id. at 402-03. 
104 Id. at 404, 413. 
105 Id. at 409. 
106 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
107 Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (holding that the installation of a GPS device on a vehicle with 
the purpose of monitoring the whereabouts of the vehicle constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
108 Id. at 413-14 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into 
account when considering the existence of a reasonable 
societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s 
public movements.  I would ask whether people 
reasonably expect that their movements will be 
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the 
Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their 
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so 
on.109 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, especially when considered 
in conjunction with the majority opinion, suggested that modern 
technological advancements do not limit an individual’s rights 
pertaining to unreasonable search and seizures as provided under the 
Fourth Amendment.   
It has been argued that the placement of advanced technology 
in the hands of the public can leave those individuals with no true 
expectation of privacy, as people who are aware of the capabilities of 
technology should have no expectation to be safe from it.110  
Nonetheless, the Court has consistently held steadfast to the belief that 
Fourth Amendment rights are fixed and not amorphous.111  While the 
Court has placed great emphasis on the expectation of privacy found 
within the four walls of the home, an overall analysis of the 
aforementioned Supreme Court cases reveal that one has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in any act that is not knowingly made public or 
ordinarily observed. 
V. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AS APPLIED TO CELL-SITE 
SIMULATION DEVICES 
With little case law discussing the limitations of law 
enforcement in utilizing cell-site simulation devices, there is a 
 
109 Id. at 415-16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
110 Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 580 (2009).  
111 See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 404, 413 (affirming the decision of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and holding that an individual’s privacy rights 
were not minimized by the government’s warrantless placement of GPS technology on the 
individual’s vehicle); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the 
government’s use of a thermal imaging device to expose intimate and private details about the 
petitioner was unconstitutional); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that 
the government’s use of an electronic recording device positioned outside of a telephone booth 
in order to listen to the petitioner’s words violated his reasonable expectation of privacy). 
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concomitant lack of agency guidance concerning use of this 
technology, especially when compared with other devices used by the 
government.112  What little is known about the regulation of cell-site 
simulators is comprised in a few acts and magistrate opinions which 
fail to account for both the frequency and recommended use of cell-
site simulators.113  Only when carefully pieced together can such scarce 
guidelines actually assist in determining the restraints that the 
government must take in using such intrusive technology.  Although 
they are few and far between, there are some acts, common law, and 
Department of Justice guidelines that have impacted the law 
concerning the collection of cell-site information.114  Below is a brief 
history of some of the most relevant acts and orders that have shaped 
the law surrounding the collection of cell-site data as known today. 
A. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1968 and Pen/Trap Orders 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1968 
(“ECPA”) was, and still is, well-known for affixing some of the 
primary restrictions on surveillance technology.115  While the ECPA 
included three titles,116 Title II and Title III of the Act are the most 
relevant to the types of electronic communication discussed herein.   
Title III of the ECPA contains provisions for the issuance of 
Pen Registers and Trap/Trace devices and is otherwise known as the 
“Pen/Trap Statute.”117  Under the ECPA, a “pen register” is a tool that 
records outgoing numbers dialed from the targeted device, while a 
“trap/trace device” is a tool that captures incoming numbers from the 
targeted device.118  Authorization for the use of such devices requires 
only two pieces of information: 1) the identity of the government agent 
making the application, and 2) the government agent’s certification 
that the information to be obtained is relevant to the pending criminal 
 
112 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 20. 
113 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 20. 
114 See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 20-34. 
115 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Auth. the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap 
and Trace Device and Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 396 F. 
Supp. 2d 747, 751 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 752. 
118 Id. 
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case.119  Once such certification is made, the reviewing judge is forced 
to issue an ex parte order, even if there is doubt as to the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the certification.120  
Based on this Act, the United States Department of Justice 
issued a 2005 Electronic Surveillance Manual and took the position 
that Pen/Trap orders “must be obtained by the government before it 
can use its own device to capture [codes unique to] a cellular 
telephone,” including location information.121  However, that very 
same manual also indicates that Pen/Trap devices do not include those 
that “identify that telephone to the network” or “receive[s] radio 
signals, emitted from a wireless cellular telephone.”122  Given that cell-
site simulators both identify telephones on a network and receive 
signals emitted from other wireless cellular telephones, it is clear that 
the Department of Justice purposefully excluded these devices from 
the list of those that require even the minimal requirements of a 
Pen/Trap Order.123  While a subsequent 2013 Department of Justice 
document indicated that a Pen/Trap Order is necessary when the 
government is trying to obtain codes unique to a target phone, it failed 
to address what type of court authorization, if any, is required to obtain 
cellular location data.124  Furthermore, even though the Pen/Trap 
provision under this Act was amended in 2001 to include any device 
that also captures “signaling information,” the type of court 
authorization required for location information continues to be 
unclear.125 
 
119 Id. at 753 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) (2012)). 
120 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Auth. the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap 
and Trace, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 753. 
121 Linda Lye, Stingrays: The Most Common Surveillance Tool the Government Won’t Tell 




123 Id. (indicating that despite the fact that cell-site simulators are excluded from the 
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B. The Stored Communications Act  
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. 
United States,126 Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA”), barring service providers from willingly disclosing customer 
communication information to any outside source, including the 
government, absent a qualifying exception.127  If such information is 
required, however, the SCA provides the necessary procedure that the 
government must follow in order to obtain a telecommunication 
customer’s information.128 
Despite the fact that the SCA frustrates the practices of many 
federal agencies that rely on their unfettered ability to obtain electronic 
communications,129 the SCA is also drastically inconsistent and 
provides little guidance as to what is required for authorized 
disclosure:   
For example, the SCA contained multiple provisions 
allowing for the disclosure of the same stored 
communications.  Under subsection (c)(1)(A), the SCA 
allows disclosure of communication information upon 
the issuance of a warrant based on probable cause.  
However, subsection (c)(1)(B) refers the reader to 
subsection (d) of the same provision, which states that 
a court “shall issue” an order directing a cell-service 
provider to disclose electronic communications only if 
the government “offers specific and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the … records or other information sought[] are 
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.”  The standard of proof of subsection 
(c)(1)(A), probable cause, and that of subsection 
(c)(1)(B), relevance to an ongoing criminal 
investigation, are clearly different.130 
 
126 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
127 Jeremy H. D’Amico, Note, Cellphones, Stingrays, and Searches! An Inquiry into the 
Legality of Cellular Location Information, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1252, 1269, 1273 (2016); 
Richard M. Thompson II & Jared P. Cole, Stored Communications Act: Reform of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1, 3 
(May 19, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44036.pdf. 
128 Thompson II & Cole, supra note 127. 
129 Thompson II & Cole, supra note 127, at 1. 
130 D’Amico, supra note 127, at 1272. 
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The SCA appears to allow courts to authorize obtainment of 
cell-site data both by a necessary showing of probable cause, a 
relatively high burden for the government to meet, while at the same 
time authorizing the obtainment of cell-site data under a much lower 
burden of proof of reasonable materiality to an ongoing 
investigation.131  As previously indicated by critics of the SCA: “Why 
would law enforcement seek to satisfy the probable cause standard 
under subsection (c)(1)(A) if it can obtain the same stored 
communications under a relevance standard of subsection 
(c)(1)(B)?”132 
The SCA also does not explicitly indicate whether cell-site data 
is a “stored communication” that is even covered under the SCA.133  
For example, the SCA’s definition of “electronic communications” 
fails to include that which comes from a “tracking device,”134 seeming 
to indicate that cell-site information could still be obtained regardless 
of the SCA’s limitations.  With the amorphous technology of cell-site 
simulators, the SCA provides little restriction on the government’s use. 
C. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
In October 1994, Congress passed the Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”) in order to require 
telecommunication carriers to obtain the technology and equipment 
necessary to provide cellular data information to the government upon 
its request.135  The government enacted CALEA due to “concerns that 
emerging technologies such as digital and wireless communications 
were making it increasingly difficult for law enforcement agencies to 
execute authorized surveillance.”136  In 2006, Congress expanded the 
reach of CALEA to include broadband Internet access providers in the 
statute’s definition of “telecommunication carriers.”137  
 
131 D’Amico, supra note 127, at 1272-73. 
132 D’Amico, supra note 127, at 1273. 
133 D’Amico, supra note 127, at 1273-74. 
134 D’Amico, supra note 127, at 1274. 
135 Lye, supra note 121, at 6. 
136 Introduction, Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/public-safety-and-homeland-
security/policy-and-licensing-division/general/communications-assistance#introduction (last 
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While CALEA prohibits the government’s use of a Pen/Trap 
Order when trying to obtain an individual’s location information,138 the 
Department of Justice’s 2005 Electronic Surveillance Manual has 
indicated that the government can still use cell-site simulators and 
other IMSI catchers to obtain location information.139  This is mostly 
due to a nuanced interpretation of CALEA, as it only applies to 
“information collected by a provider and not information collected 
directly by law enforcement authorities.”140  Therefore, interpreting 
when it is safe to use a cell-site simulator, in what capacity, and upon 
what authorization remains unclear. 
D. The 2001 U.S.A. Patriot Act  
As technology rapidly advanced at the beginning of the twenty-
first century, the government’s need for easy access to a vast array of 
electronic data also reached an all-time high.  After the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the Patriot Act, which was 
characterized as a “‘sweeping antiterrorism law that gave the 
government vast new powers to conduct electronic 
surveillance. . . .”141  Though enacted to increase the government’s role 
in the private lives of citizens for protection purposes, the Patriot Act 
actually increased the privacy of many individuals when it came to 
cell-site information142—something that had yet to be definitively done 
before.  
Under the Patriot Act, the term “pen register” was expanded to 
include any “device or process which records or decodes dialing, 
routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an 
instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication 
is transmitted”143 and it required definitive court authorization, by way 
of a Pen/Trap Order,144 before it could be obtained by the 
 
138 Lye, supra note 121, at 6. 
139 Lye, supra note 121, at 6. 
140 Lye, supra note 121, at 6. 
141 Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That 
Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 607 (2003).  
142 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 26. 
143 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 26 n.130. 
144 As a reminder, a Pen/Trap Order requires only that the government agent making the 
application identify himself or herself and certify that the information to be obtained is relevant 
to a pending criminal investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) (2012). 
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government.145  Given that cell-site simulators work by obtaining 
information from the signals emitted by a cellular device, the Patriot 
Act suggested that the government’s use of cell-site simulators had to 
be preceded by a Pen/Register Order authorized by the court.146  
Although the proof necessary to obtain a Pen/Register Order is not a 
particularly difficult burden for the government to meet,147 the Patriot 
Act at least prevents the government from using cell-site simulation 
technology without any authorization by the court, as was likely 
previously allowable under the SCA and CALEA due to their 
conflicting provisions.  
E. The 2012 StingRay Magistrate Opinion 
Despite the government’s long-term use of cell-site simulators, 
it was not until 2012 that federal judges began to address the capacities 
of cell-site simulators and their impact on individual’s Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure rights.  In 2012, a Texas federal 
magistrate judge issued one of the first orders denying the use of a 
StingRay machine, a portable device that would allow the government 
to capture radio signals from the target’s cellular telephone, analyze 
the target’s registration data, and use the collected information to 
determine his location.148  In this particular case, the DEA was 
conducting a criminal investigation of the defendant, a suspected 
narcotics trafficker.149  Having knowledge that the defendant had been 
using his cell phone to initiate trafficking operations, the DEA applied 
to the court for authorization to install and use “a pen register trap and 
trace device for a period of sixty (60) days to detect radio signals 
emitted from wireless cellular telephones in the vicinity of the 
[defendant]. . . .”150  The DEA further notified the court that it intended 
to obtain this information through the use of a StingRay machine.151 
 
145 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 27. 
146 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 27. 
147 See supra note 144. 
148 In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. 
Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
149 Id. at 748. 
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While the court noted that Pen/Register Orders had typically 
been used to obtain cellular data,152 it also indicated that the method 
that the DEA proposed to use to obtain the data in this case would 
virtually transform the defendant’s cellular phone into a government 
tracking device.153  As the burden of proof for a Pen/Register Order 
would only require the identity of the government agent making the 
application and his certification that the information to be obtained is 
relevant to a pending criminal case,154 the court determined that the 
DEA’s use of a StingRay machine to track the defendant required a 
higher burden of proof than a typical Pen/Trap Order.155  Due to the 
wide array of information that could be obtained with the StingRay 
device, as well as the DEA’s lack of proof as to why the StingRay 
machine would be sufficiently allowable for use under only a 
Pen/Register Order, the court denied the DEA’s application for its 
use.156  The court was concerned that the DEA was unable to explain 
the StingRay technology and how it could be limited to obtaining only 
the defendant’s information.157  Clearly, the high likelihood of 
infringement, even inadvertently, on an individual’s constitutional 
rights had finally become apparent.  
F. The September 2015 U.S. Department of Justice Order 
of Public Affairs re: Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-
Site Simulators 
On September 3, 2015, the Department of Justice issued a 
directive specifically related to the government’s use of cell-site 
simulators during investigations, requiring “increased privacy 
protections and higher legal standards.”158  The directive promised to 
 
152 Id. at 748-49; see also In the Matter of an Application of the United States of America 
For an Order Authorizing the Use of a Two Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices, 632 F. 
Supp. 2d 202, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (granting the government’s application for the obtainment 
of cell-site information because it was based on “specific and articulable facts showing 
reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought is relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation”). 
153 In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 752. 
154 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) (2012). 
155 In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 752. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 749. 
158 Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST. (Sep. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-
enhanced-policy-use-cell-site-simulators (referring to The DOJ Cell-Site Simulator Policy, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sep. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/download). 
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increase accountability, “improve training and supervision,” and create 
a more “consistent legal standard” for its use,159  and was applicable to 
federal law enforcement agencies administered by the Department of 
Justice.160   
With this policy, the Department of Justice desired to protect 
the privacy rights of individuals through careful auditing to ensure that 
insufficient data obtained through the use of cell-site simulators was 
appropriately deleted, including the content of text messages, emails, 
contact lists and pictures.”161  It also indicated that the new policy 
clarified “that cell-site simulators may not be used to collect the 
contents of any communication in the course of criminal 
investigations.”162  Despite the above, the Department of Justice still 
recommended that government users of cell-site technology obtain a 
search warrant supported by probable cause before attempting to use 
the technology.163  This unequivocal assertion suggests that even the 
Department of Justice was aware of the potential infringement of 
individual constitutional rights that could occur with the use of cell-
site simulation devices.  However, these recommendations concerning 
the use of cell-site simulators have yet to be addressed by either the 
Supreme Court or the New York Court of Appeals. 
VI. THE THIRD-PARTY DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE 
A. History  
With the Supreme Court narrowing the Fourth Amendment’s 
focus and protections on whether an individual has a “legitimate 
expectation of privacy” in the activity in question,164 the third-party 
disclosure doctrine has been a significant obstacle in a proponent’s 
argument that cell-site information falls into a constitutionally 
protected category. 
The most well-known case addressing the third-party 






163 Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, supra 
note 158. 
164 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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States.165  Here, the defendant was convicted for the sale of opium 
based on incriminating statements that he unknowingly made to an 
undercover agent working for the Bureau of Narcotics.166  While the 
defendant argued that evidence of his statements should be suppressed 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court nevertheless 
affirmed the defendant’s conviction, holding that information given 
with consent and made freely available to the public was not a violation 
of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.167 
Later courts began broadening Lee’s holding to include not 
only public conversations but also any combination of acts that were 
purposefully made public.168  These cases stood for the proposition that 
“when a person reveals some information to a third party, they assume 
the risk that the third party may disclose it to the Government.”169  
Therefore, no individual could validly allege a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights in the government’s obtainment of any information 
that he willingly made public.  
However, the concept of assuming all risk during voluntary 
relinquishment of information became, and remains, cloudier when 
considering intangible information, such as cell-site data.  Any cell-
phone user can recall signing a rather lengthy carrier contract when 
initiating service, often filled with legal jargon and endless terms, 
representations, and warranties; however, few, if any, can remember 
the terms to which they signed.170  Instead, one usually only recalls that 
the provided terms must be agreed to before the carrier provides the 
 
165 Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
166 Id. at 749. 
167 Id. at 750-52 (indicating that the information obtained from the defendant was given 
freely with his consent). 
168 Browne, supra note 2, at 86 (indicating that voluntary relinquishment of an expectation 
of privacy is exemplified in many daily activities made purposefully public, including 
“numbers dialed on a telephone, deposit slips handed to a bank teller, information written on 
the exterior of a package sent through the mail, statements made to undercover police officers, 
personal documents handed over to government officials, trash left for pickup by municipal 
employees, or academic papers turned over to professors”). 
169 In the Matter of an Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing 
the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 120 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-46 (1979)).  
170 United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2015) (indicating that “studies have 
shown that users of electronic communication services often do not read or understand their 
providers’ privacy policies.”). 
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user with service.171  Few really ever consider what “providing the user 
with service” truly means.172  While it does mean that the user has 
accessibility to his address book, his social calendar, and the 
worldwide web at the push of a button, it also means that the user is 
allowing the carrier to be the third-party receiver for all incoming and 
outgoing cellular data.173  
Therefore, by using the cellular phone and agreeing to the 
carrier’s terms, a user is voluntarily conveying his cellular information, 
including location, to the carrier for processing.174  As the agreement 
to convey this information is usually done in a willing and purposeful 
manner, does the cellular user now assume all risk that his information 
and location may fall into the hands of the government?  There has yet 
to be clear judicial insight as to whether the third-party disclosure 
doctrine would provide valid reasoning to infer than an individual’s 
signing of a cellular phone contract causes him to voluntarily forfeit 
his expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in instances 
involving cell-site simulators. 
B. The Third-Party Disclosure Doctrine and Cellular 
Information as Interpreted by the Courts 
The most notable case involving cellular information and the 
third-party doctrine arose from the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith 
v Maryland.175  Here, after Patricia McDonough was robbed, she began 
receiving threatening phone calls and visits from a man who claimed 
to be the robber.176  When the police ran the license plate provided by 
McDonough after one of the visits, the police found out that the car 
belonged to defendant, Michael Lee Smith.177  Thereafter, the police 
obtained a Pen/Register Order which allowed the telephone company 
 
171 Liane Cassavoy, Before You Sign a Cell Phone Contract: What You Need to Know, 
LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/before-signing-cell-phone-contract-579606 (last updated 
Oct. 17, 2016). 
172 Id. 
173 Browne, supra note 2, at 65-66. 
174 In the Matter of an Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing 
the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (indicating that when 
one turns his phone on and utilizes calling and texting features, he is “voluntarily” conveying 
his cellular data to the third-party service carrier).  
175 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
176 Id. at 737. 
177 Id.  
27
Jonassen: Cell-Site Simulators
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
1150 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
to record the numbers dialed from the defendant’s home telephone.178  
The Register eventually revealed that calls were placed from the 
defendant’s phone to McDonough’s home.179  Based on these findings, 
the police obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s home, where 
they found a phone book flagged with McDonough’s number.180  The 
defendant was arrested, identified by McDonough, and indicted for 
robbery.181  
The defendant submitted a pre-trial motion seeking to suppress 
all evidence obtained from the Pen/Register Order, claiming that the 
police’s failure to secure a probable cause warrant violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.182  The 
trial court denied the defendant’s motion and the appellate court 
affirmed the defendant’s conviction.183  Thereafter, the Supreme Court 
held that people had no “actual expectation of privacy” in the phone 
numbers they dial since all users were forced to submit the numbers to 
the telephone carrier in order for the calls to be completed.184  Citing 
United States v. Miller,185 the Court determined that the defendant 
“assumed the risk of disclosure” and therefore it was unreasonable for 
him to expect the phone numbers that he dialed to remain private.186  
 
178 Id. 
179 Id.  
180 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 737-38. 
184 Id. at 735.  The court further held that: 
All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities 
for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they see a list 
of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills. In fact, pen 
registers and similar devices are routinely used by telephone companies 
“for the purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fraud and 
preventing violations of law.”  United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 
U.S., at 174–175, 98 S.Ct., at 373.  Electronic equipment is used not only 
to keep billing records of toll calls, but also “to keep a record of all calls 
dialed from a telephone which is subject to a special rate 
structure.”  Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254, 266 
(CA9 1977) (concurring opinion).  
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. 
185 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
186 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (“This analysis dictates that petitioner can claim no legitimate 
expectation of privacy here.  When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed 
numerical information to the telephone company and “exposed” that information to its 
equipment in the ordinary course of business.  In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the 
company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.  The switching equipment that 
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Though not specifically discussing location tracking, the Court’s 
ruling expanded the concept of the third-party disclosure doctrine to 
telephone devices.187 
In State v. Andrews,188 the Court of Special Appeals in 
Maryland was asked to decide whether a cell phone could be turned 
into a “real-time tracking device by the government without a warrant” 
in light of the State’s argument that the third-party doctrine prevented 
the defendant from proclaiming a Fourth Amendment violation.189  
Here, the Baltimore City Police Department picked up the defendant, 
Kerron Andrews, through the warrantless use of a cell-site 
simulator.190  Specifically, the Baltimore City Police ascertained the 
defendant’s location by using Hailstorm, a brand of cell-site simulator, 
which tricked the defendant’s phone into providing signals that the 
police used to narrow his location to a specific residence in Baltimore 
City.191  The Hailstorm was authorized for police use through the 
obtainment of a Pen/Register-Trap/Trace Order, which allowed for 
collection of GPS data from the defendant’s cellular device.192  The 
government obtained the defendant’s precise location with the 
assistance of the defendant’s cellular carrier and through the 
defendant’s use of the email application on his phone.193 
The Baltimore City Police Department obtained an arrest 
warrant and went to the defendant’s residence, finding him on the 
couch with the targeted cell phone in his pants pocket.194  At trial, the 
defendant argued that the Baltimore City Police Department’s use of 
the cell-site simulator without a probable cause warrant constituted an 
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, to 
which the Circuit Court agreed and suppressed all evidence as “fruit of 
the poisonous tree.”195  The State appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland,196  which held that the use of the cell-site 
 
processed those numbers is merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier 
day, personally completed calls for the subscriber.”). 
187 Id. at 744-45. 
188 State v. Andrews, 227 Md. App. 350 (2016). 
189 Id. at 354, 395. 
190 Id. at 354. 
191 Id. at 359. 
192 Id. at 356-57. 
193 Andrews, 227 Md. App. at 359. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 354. 
196 Id. at 354-55. 
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simulator did constitute an illegal search and seizure despite arguments 
that the defendant chose to voluntarily provide his cellular data to the 
public through the mere activation of his cellular phone.197  The court 
further identified the government’s use of cell-site simulation 
technology as the beginning of an “age of no privacy.”198 
Despite the State’s argument that the cell-site simulator merely 
obtained cellular data “regularly transmitted by activated cell phones 
as part of their ordinary use,”199 the court distinguished the cell-site 
simulator from a typical cellular phone tower in that a StingRay device 
tricks the cellular phones into transmitting data rather than just 
collecting data already being transmitted.200  Accordingly, the court 
determined that cell phone users do not voluntarily convey this 
information “simply by choosing to activate and use their cell phones 
and to carry the devices on their person.”201  Relying on Katz’s holding 
that the Fourth Amendment applies to people and not places, the court 
concluded that people do have a legitimate expectation in real-time cell 
data, including location information.202  As such, the court held that 
the Baltimore City Police Department’s use of a cell-site simulator 
without a valid search warrant based on probable cause was a violation 
of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free from illegal 
searches and seizures.203 
VII. THE LAW AS IT STANDS TODAY: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
AS APPLIED TO CELL-SITE SIMULATION DEVICES 
A. United States v. Rigmaiden 
In 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit decided a case involving a cell-site simulator in United States 
v. Rigmaiden.204  Here, the government alleged that the defendant had 
been using the identities of individuals (some deceased) to file 
 
197 Id. at 392-93. 
198 Andrews, 227 Md. App. 350 at 371-72. 
199 Id. at 377-78. 
200 Id. at 379. 
201 Id. at 392 (indicating that cellular phone users do not actively submit their location 
information to their service provider). 
202 Id. at 355. 
203 Andrews, 227 Md. App. at 355-56. 
204 United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800 (D. Ariz. 
May 8, 2013). 
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fraudulent tax returns through the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) 
website, enabling him to claim more than $3,000,000 in tax refunds.205  
In moving to suppress evidence against him, the defendant claimed 
that the process used by the IRS in obtaining his identification and 
location violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable 
search and seizure.206   
Specifically, in 2007, the IRS subpoenaed subscriber 
information for the internet addresses that the defendant used to file 
the allegedly fraudulent returns, discovering that the address was 
associated with a Verizon wireless Internet card owned by someone 
named Travis Rupard.207  In 2008, the IRS Fraud Detention Center 
identified a large number of potentially fraudulent tax filings that 
required refunds to be sent to different debit cards all associated with 
the same bank account.208  After doing further research, the IRS Fraud 
Detention Center found that the accounts were maintained by the same 
Travis Rupard, though it suspected that this was a false identity as the 
address and driver’s license number associated with the account 
belonged to a female by a different name.209   
The IRS pursued further investigations of this individual, 
eventually coming across an e-mail exchange between Rupard and a 
co-conspirator wherein Rupard had requested that the co-conspirator 
establish a bank account for his fraudulent tax filings.210  The 
government also obtained transaction logs from Verizon in connection 
with the use of the defendant’s wireless Internet card.211  Combining 
this information with the email correspondence, the IRS was able to 
identify that the defendant, using the alias “Travis Rupard,” was the 
actual owner of the wireless card.212  The IRS was thus able to 
synthesize these facts to determine that the location of the wireless card 
would lead them right to the defendant.213  The police obtained cell-
site records from the network carrier connected with the Internet card, 
Verizon Wireless, and discovered that the Internet card was being used 
 
205 Id. at *1. 
206 Id. at *4. 
207 Id. at *1. 
208 Id. 
209 Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800 at *1. 
210 Id. at *2. 
211 Id.  
212 Id.  
213 Id.  
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regularly between the same towers around Santa Clara, California.214  
Wanting the defendant’s location, the police manipulated cell towers 
until they were able to determine a point within an area of just one-
quarter mile of his location.215   
Thereafter, the police obtained an order from the court that 
authorized the installation of a cell-site tracking device via a 
Pen/Register and Trap/Trace Order.216  Upon further use of this device, 
the police tracked the use of the Internet card directly to the specific 
apartment where the defendant lived.217  The police then verified that 
the apartment belonged to the defendant and obtained a search warrant 
of the apartment, leading to the defendant’s arrest.218  The defendant 
was indicted on 74 counts of mail and wire fraud, after which he made 
a motion to suppress any information obtained by the police through 
the use of the cell-site simulator, arguing that the collected information 
was outside the scope of the warrant obtained by the police.219 
The Ninth Circuit ultimately found that the defendant did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in either the Internet card, his 
laptop, or his apartment.220  As the defendant had obtained the Internet 
card and laptop fraudulently and used the Internet card and laptop 
solely for fraudulent purposes, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
defendant could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such 
use.221  Although the defendant may have had a “thoroughly justified 
subjective expectation of privacy” in his use of the equipment, the 
court determined that it was “not one which the law recognizes as 
legitimate.”222  Further, the court determined that the defendant’s 
presence in the apartment was also wrongful because it was 
fraudulently registered under the name of a deceased individual.223  
Therefore, the court determined that the defendant also had no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment.224   
 





219 Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800 at *1. 
220 Id. at *5. 
221 Id.  
222 Id. at *6 (relying on Rakas v. Illinois, 429 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)). 
223 Id.  
224 Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800 at *6 (“One who so thoroughly immerses himself in 
layers of false identities should not later be heard to argue that society must recognize as 
legitimate his expectation of privacy in the location and implements of his fraud.”). 
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In sum, the Ninth Circuit held that given the “totality of the 
unique circumstances,” the defendant lacked an “objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy” and that “[a]s a result, no Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred when the government searched for and 
located the [Internet card] in his apartment.”225  Nonetheless, since the 
defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in this case, the 
court never addressed whether the cell-site simulation device was 
properly used and authorized. 
In 2016, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York decided a similar issue in United States v. 
Lambis.226  Here, the DEA was authorized, under a Pen/Register 
warrant, to obtain cell-site data to determine the defendant’s location 
on suspicion that he was part of an international drug-trafficking 
scheme.227  Through the use of pen register technology, the DEA was 
able to narrow the defendant’s location to “the Washington Heights 
area by 177th and Broadway” but was unable to identify an apartment 
building or apartment number.228  Therefore, the DEA arranged for an 
agent to physically carry a portable StingRay device, which simulated 
nearby cell towers and forced surrounding cellular phones to transmit 
location information, around the identified Washington Heights 
area.229  By using the StingRay machine, the agent was able to identify 
the apartment building where the defendant was located, and was 
further able to locate the defendant’s specific apartment number after 
walking up and down the halls with the device until he found the 
location where “the signal was strongest.”230   
After identifying that the apartment belonged to the defendant, 
the DEA obtained consent to search the defendant’s bedroom and 
recovered evidence that led to his arrest.231  The defendant moved to 
suppress all evidence found in his apartment on the basis, similar to 
the holding in Kyllo v. United States,232 that the use of the cell-site 
simulator constituted an unreasonable search of the interior of his 
 
225 Id. at *9. 
226 United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
227 Id. at 608. 
228 Id. at 609. 
229 Id.  
230 Id.  
231 Lambis, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 609. 
232 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that it was a Fourth Amendment 
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home and surveilled activities that were not purposefully made 
public.233  Contrarily, the government argued that its use of the 
StingRay machine was authorized under the original Pen/Register 
warrant and therefore did not constitute a violation of the defendant’s 
constitutional rights.234   
The Southern District of New York ultimately held that the use 
of the StingRay technology to determine the defendant’s precise 
location was not contemplated in the approval of the original warrant 
application and was therefore outside of its scope.235  Even though the 
government argued that it had sufficient probable cause at the time that 
the StingRay machine was used, the court determined that the 
government’s belief was not sufficient because it was required under 
the Fourth Amendment to obtain such a warrant from a magistrate 
prior to conducting the search, not after.236  The court supported its 
determination with evidence that internal policies issued by the 
Department of Justice required the government to obtain a valid search 
warrant prior to the use of cell-site simulation technology.237  Given 
the court’s emphasis on the inherent intrusiveness of the StingRay 
devices,238 as well as the indication that the minimal requirements 
needed to establish a Pen/Register warrant were insufficient in this 
case,239 Lambis suggests that probable cause must be established in 
order to authorize use of these highly-intrusive cell-site simulation 
devices.240  
VIII. ANALYSIS: PROBABLE CAUSE IS THE APPROPRIATE 
STANDARD FOR THE USE OF CELL-SITE SIMULATION 
TECHNOLOGY 
With no definitive consensus as to whether the government’s 
use of StingRay machines and other types of cell-site simulators 
violates an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights against 
unreasonable searches and seizures without a probable cause warrant, 
 
233 Lambis, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 610. 
234 Id. at 611. 
235 Id.  
236 Id.  
237 Id.  
238 The court finds a cell-site simulation search to be much more “intrusive than a canine 
sniff,” for example. Lambis, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 610. 
239 Id. at 611. 
240 Id.  
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the current state of the law has allowed the government to use these 
highly-intrusive devices with minimal boundaries.241  However, given 
that the courts have previously expressed concern over a privacy-less 
society,242 and the fact that individuals have an expectation and belief 
that the government is not going to  track their location and cellular 
data without their consent,243 it is likely that the Supreme Court would 
hold that the government is not authorized to utilize these highly 
invasive and machines without a showing of probable cause. 
The Department of Justice has already recommended that the 
use of cell-site technology, including cell-site simulators, be 
authorized only with sufficient probable cause.244  As discussed supra 
in Section V, the Department of Justice, concerned by the Fourth 
Amendment implications of cell-site simulators,245 has stated that the 
government’s application for the use of a cell-site simulator should 
include the specifics of the technology to be used, the possibility that 
the retrieval of information from a target phone could disrupt other 
cellular devices in the area, and how that specific government agency 
plans to ensure that the data collected will no longer be accessible 
during future uses of the technology.246  As such, the proverbial red 
flag has clearly been waived.  For the Department of Justice to issue a 
department-wide policy concerning the use of cell-site simulation 
technology, its reservations concerning the potential constitutional 
infringement that such technology can cause must be relatively 
strong.247  Following suit, the Supreme Court is also likely to see how 
threatening this technology can be to the Fourth Amendment 
protections.  
 
241 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 35 (indicating that there is a “dearth of judicial 
analysis” on the topic of cell-site simulators and the collection of cell-site data by the 
government despite the use of “cellular surveillance devices for more than twenty years”). 
242 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415-16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
243 D’Amico, supra note 127, at 1279-80. 
244 Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, supra 
note 158. 
245 Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, supra 
note 158. 
246 Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, supra 
note 158. 
247 See United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (indicating that 
the Department of Justice’s enhanced policy was based on its own recognition that it “may not 
turn a citizen’s cell phone into a tracking device”). 
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Since StingRay machines and other cell-site simulators have a 
unique ability and inadvertent likelihood that they will penetrate the 
area at the very core of the Fourth Amendment, the four walls of the 
home, common law precedent requires that a probable cause warrant 
be issued prior to its use.248  For example, in Andrews, the police, after 
tracing the defendant’s phone, found the defendant sitting on his couch 
with his cellular phone in his pocket.249  Clearly, the use of the 
StingRay machine in that case penetrated the interior of the home and 
should, according to Kyllo, automatically constitute an unreasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment.250  However, even when cell-site 
simulators do not track an individual’s precise location to an area 
within the four walls of his home, the Court in Jones has suggested that 
the use of cell-site simulators without a sufficient probable cause 
warrant can still classify as an unreasonable intrusion into the private 
life of an individual because lengthy surveillance monitoring can 
provide intimate details about a person’s “familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations . . . .”251 
One of the most important functions of the cell-site simulator 
is also its biggest problem.  Cell-site simulators obtain not only 
location and registration information from the targeted cellular phone 
user, but also incidental information from third-party devices using the 
same cell network and towers.252  Even the Department of Justice 
acknowledged this flaw as recently as 2015, when it promised to audit 
the type and amount of information collected when utilizing cell-site 
 
248 See generally In Support of a Warrant Requirement for the Use of StingRays, supra note 
16. 
249 State v. Andrews, 227 Md. App. 350, 359 (2016). 
250 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that obtaining “details of the 
home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion” constitutes a 
search under the Fourth Amendment that requires a probable cause warrant). 
251 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415-16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see 
also People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 441-42 (2009) (indicating that location monitoring 
could reveals acts of “indisputably private nature” such as “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic 
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDs treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense 
attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, [and] 
the gay bar”). 
252 Memorandum: Warrant Requirement for the Use of Stingrays in New York, N.Y. CIV. 
LIBERTIES UNION 5 (Aug. 2015), 
https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/memo_stingrayuse_NY_201508_final.pdf 
(indicating that reports show that even when personal information is not obtained from 
unintended users through the use of a cell-site simulator, use of the machine can still interfere 
with others’ cell phone service, downgrading their service connectivity from 3G or 4G to 2G). 
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simulators department-wide.253  However, while promises may be 
made, there is no actual way to prevent the collection of this extraneous 
data, considering that the cell-site simulators force the targeted phone 
and surrounding phones to disclose such information.254  The mere fact 
that such an overbreadth of information can be received and reviewed 
by the government without the knowledge of the cellular user is 
certainly an infringement on that individual’s constitutional rights 
because few, if any, individuals actively submit this information for 
public use.255  Therefore, to allow such information to be obtained 
without at least a demonstration of probable cause would be 
unconstitutional because it would not adequately safeguard an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.256 
With regard to how the third-party doctrine applies to the use 
of cell-site simulators, Andrews and Lambis provide the most logical 
explanations.  Cell-site simulators do not simply intercept data being 
conveyed through a cellular device to a corresponding carrier’s cell 
tower; instead, they force the phone to send communications that it 
may not otherwise emit for the sole purpose of intercepting those 
communications, interpreting the data, and pinpointing the exact 
location of the user.257  Though many individuals today understand that 
their cellular data can be incidentally intercepted by virtue of the 
unique way in which cellular devices function, they most certainly do 
not have an expectation that the government may hack their phones to 
determine their almost precise location.258  Generally, third-party 
carriers are able to provide some “push-back” to any government 
 
253 Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, supra 
note 158. 
254 Browne, supra note 2, at 86 (indicating that “[n]o affirmative action is required for cell 
phone users to convey their CSLI to a cell phone service provider”). 
255 United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (indicating that cell-
site data being transmitted to cell-site simulators has a “layer of involuntariness” as they are 
“not transmitted in the normal course of the phone’s operation” but are forced by the cell-site 
technology to “transmit their unique identifying electronic serial numbers”); Browne, supra 
note 2, at 86. 
256 Browne, supra note 2, at 71-72 (“Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been 
withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the 
home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight.”).  Interestingly, this 
source has failed to identify what “withdrawing from public view” entails and whether or not 
an affirmative act is required for “withdrawal” from public view to take place. 
257 Proposed Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 65, at 8, 10. 
258 Memorandum: Warrant Requirement for the Use of Stingrays in New York, supra note 
252, at 2 (indicating that cell phone owners do not ever believe that their phone is “connecting 
with . . .  a law enforcement device”). 
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attempts at invalid intrusions; however, given that Stingrays and other 
cell-site devices are able to bypass third-party authorizations and still 
obtain location information without leaving behind any virtual 
footprints,259 it can be argued that this is not a right that anyone could 
unequivocally forfeit absent knowledge about basic cell-site simulator 
functionality.   
Furthermore, as cell-site simulators respond to the basic 
functionality of cellular devices in obtaining their information,260 the 
individual never affirmatively acts to convey the information to the 
carrier.261  This contrasts greatly with the cases in which the courts 
have determined the third-party disclosure doctrine to be a bar against 
privacy expectations in information purposefully made public.262  
Unless the potential risks of government interference are clearly 
explained to an individual prior to his or her agreement to use a cellular 
device, it is unclear whether that individual voluntarily and knowingly 
waived his right to privacy under the third-party disclosure doctrine.263  
Understanding such, it is clear that individuals do have an expectation 
of privacy in their cellular location, and since the Constitution 
prohibits such unreasonable and intrusive searches under the Fourth 
Amendment, the most likely outcome is that the Supreme Court will 
require that probable cause be established before the government can 
utilize a cell-site simulator.  Given that probable cause requires at least 
a fair probability that a search will be successful in obtaining the 
 
259 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 21, at 147. 
260 As documented supra, cell-site simulators obtain their information from the registration 
processes performed by cellular devices every seven seconds.  Electronic Surveillance 
Manual, supra note 36, at 178-79 n.41. 
261 Browne, supra note 2, at 86. 
262 See Browne, supra note 2, at 86 (indicating that voluntary relinquishment of an 
expectation of privacy was exemplified in many daily activities made purposefully public, 
including “numbers dialed on a telephone, deposit slips handed to a bank teller, information 
written on the exterior of a package sent through the mail, statements made to undercover 
police officers, personal documents handed over to government officials, trash left for pickup 
by municipal employees, or academic papers turned over to professors”). 
263 Browne, supra note 2, at 86-87 (“Oblique mention in a statement of terms and conditions 
or user agreement for cell phone service that the service provider might share certain 
information with the government when required to do so does not change this result.  Every 
rational presumption is indulged against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; unless a 
cell phone user receives a clear, explicit, and conspicuous explanation that use of their phone 
result in their location and movements being warrantlessly monitored, he should not be 
presumed to waive his Fourth Amendment rights when his cell phone is turned on.  Warnings 
of similar prominence have been required in agreements that purport to waive other 
constitutional and contractual rights.”). 
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information that it seeks,264 rather than a finding that the search is 
merely relevant to the investigation,265 the probable cause standard 
provides the greatest guarantee of protection for individuals that the 
Fourth Amendment sought to preserve. 
While the government may put forth arguments of the 
invaluable services that cell-site simulators provide, including 
assistance in locating wanted, and often quite dangerous, criminals,266 
it should be noted that the need for a higher quantum of proof for the 
authorization of cell-site simulators does not seek to demote the 
invaluable assistance that these devices could provide if properly 
authorized.  Cell-site simulators can still provide instrumental 
information to federal agencies and local police departments to assist 
in their obtainment of justice; however, the ability to use this highly 
technical equipment should not be based on the mere certification of a 
government agent that the information to be obtained is relevant.267  
Instead, the sheer invasiveness of cell-site simulation technology into 
the private lives of its subjects should require an establishment of 
sufficient probable cause for its use.268  Moreover, while some 
agencies, such as the Securities Exchange Commission, may rely on 
the minimum burden of proof that they need to demonstrate in order to 
obtain cellular and other electronic data,269 the fact “that this is the way 
it had always been done” is simply not a justifiable argument when it 
comes to the infringement of an individual’s constitutional rights. 
Moreover, while some agencies may fear that a required 
showing of probable cause prior to the use of cell-site simulation 
technology can obstruct justice,270 this requirement is not exempt from 
 
264 U.S. v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 
(1983)). 
265 See 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) (2012) (listing the criteria for application of a Pen/Register 
Order). 
266 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a 
Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
267 See 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) (2012) (listing the criteria for application of a Pen/Register 
Order). 
268 Browne, supra note 2, at 84-85. 
269 Thompson II & Cole, supra note 127, at 1. 
270 StingRay technology has been described by federal officials as the way it “track[s] 
dangerous criminals . . . find[s] killers . . . find[s] kidnappers . . . find[s] drug dealers . . . [and] 
find[s] missing children . . . .” Brad Heath, Police Secretly Track Cellphones to Solve Routine 
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certain exigencies which demand prompt attention.271  This would not 
only account for the many critical situations in which time is of the 
essence for criminal investigations but would also allow the 
government to utilize this high-grade technology for assistance in 
obtaining necessary information during state-wide or country-wide 
emergencies.  The waiver of the probable cause requirement in exigent 
circumstances could diminish the government’s fear of an overall lack 
of control but also contemporaneously help individuals maintain their 
civil liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Since its creation, the Fourth Amendment has protected an 
individual against unreasonable searches and seizures.272  This 
protection was initially based on common-law principles of trespass, 
as determined in Olmstead v. United States, which required actual 
physical intrusion on private property before standing for a valid 
Fourth Amendment violation was found.273  In these situations, private 
property was inherently determined to be an area in which one 
reasonably expected his activities to remain private.274  However, with 
the emergence of new technology, the Supreme Court was forced to 
address many situations in which an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights could be implicated without the occurrence of physical 
trespass.275  This caused the Court to shift its reliance from places to 
people when determining Fourth Amendment claims.276  The Court has 
since broadened Fourth Amendment protections in all situations where 
there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy.277   
Yet, with the development of advanced surveillance 
technology, individuals’ specific expectations of privacy have been 
 
271 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (indicating that there are a 
“few specifically established and well delineated exceptions” to the probable cause 
requirement that would justify the government’s failure to obtain the probable cause warrant 
before conducting a search). 
272 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
273 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
274 Id. at 474-75. 
275 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27 (2001); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
276 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
277 See generally Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51, 359. 
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further called into question.278  While the Court had previously found 
that no expectation of privacy could possibly exist in situations where 
individuals made seemingly private details public,279 the creation of 
cell-site simulation technology currently used by the United States 
government, military agencies, and intelligence agencies280 has turned 
previously private information inadvertently into public knowledge.281  
This is of particular importance when it comes to cellular telephones 
and similar electronic devices for the reasons discussed in this Note. 
Cellular telephones function through the outward emission of 
radio transmission waves.282  These waves are automatically 
transmitted by the electronic device, regardless of the user’s 
knowledge and intent, as long as the cellular device remains turned 
on.283  While this technology allows the user to quickly and easily 
make and receive telephone calls, this process also makes these radio 
transmissions highly susceptible to third-party interference.284  Though 
this interference is generally harmless, typically coming from outside 
carriers that assist in providing a strong signal to the cellular user,285 
data emitted by the cellular telephone is also subject to collection by 
the government through the use of a cell-site simulator.286  Like cell 
towers, these simulators accept incoming radio transmissions; 
however, they do so only by tricking nearby cellular devices into 
thinking that they are cellular towers.287  Contrary to regular cell 
towers, these cell-site simulators are portable, box-shaped devices that 
the government often uses to obtain a target’s precise identification 
information.288  Even if an individual is not the target of the 
 
278 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34 (wherein the Court determined that technology clearly affected 
the application of the Fourth Amendment and a vital question within this context concerned 
“what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed 
privacy”).  
279 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 
35, 35 (1988); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 171 (1984).  
280 Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, supra note 69. 
281 Kerr, supra note 110, at 580 (indicating that “new technologies can bring “ ‘intimate 
occurrences of the home out in the open’ “). 
282 Browne, supra note 2, at 61-62. 
283 Browne, supra note 2, at 62. 
284 This is based on the concept that relay signals from cell phones effectively bounce back 
and forth between a network of cell towers until they reach their intended destination.  Browne, 
supra note 2, at 62. 
285 Browne, supra note 2, at 62. 
286 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 16-17. 
287 Owsley, supra note 19, at 192. 
288 Gallagher, supra note 51. 
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government’s investigation, that individual’s cellular location may still 
be collected if he or she is within range of the cell-site simulator.289 
Despite the obvious privacy concerns that come with the 
functionality of cell-site simulators, the government’s use of these 
devices has managed to evade court discretion for years.290  While 
there have been some attempts to control the government’s use of 
surveillance technology of this type, the lack of knowledge concerning 
the capabilities of these devices has led to inconsistent and virtually 
unhelpful attempts at regulation.291  For example, the enactment of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Stored 
Communications Act has only led to further confusion over what type 
of information, if any, the government should supply to the courts for 
authorization of the use of cell-site simulation technology.  While the 
very provisions of these acts are inconsistent, they have been 
interpreted to only require certification by a government agent that the 
information to be obtained is relevant to a criminal investigation,292 
consistent with the requirements of a Pen/Register Order.293  However, 
this rather low burden of proof fails to account for the significant 
impact this technology has on an individual’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy. 
The invasiveness of surveillance technology has been well-
documented by the court in Jones, where it was found that real-time 
tracking of individuals inevitably leads to the publication of private 
details about their personal lives which may not have ever been meant 
to be made public.294  Accordingly, there is a need for a higher burden 
of proof before such devices can be utilized by the government in order 
to protect the private lives of citizens.  A probable cause requirement, 
to be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate, prior to the 
government’s use of cell-site simulators is warranted for the following 
reasons: (1) the inherently intrusive nature of the cell-site simulator 
devices;295 (2) the overbreadth of information that can be inadvertently 
collected by StingRay machines and other cell-site simulators;296 (3) 
 
289 Owsley, supra note 19, at 185-86 (indicating that these devices obtain data from all 
cellular users who happen to be in the area, regardless of the government’s intention). 
290 Browne, supra note 2, at 57. 
291 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 20. 
292 D’Amico, supra note 127, at 1272-73; Lye, supra note 121, at 5. 
293 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) (2012). 
294 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415-16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).   
295 Id. 
296 Owsley, supra note 19, at 185-86. 
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the lack of guarantee that such information will be properly discarded 
after their use;297 (4) the cellular user’s lack of knowledge that such 
information is being transmitted and collected;298 and (5) the inability 
of the user to know whether cell-site simulation technology will be 
used to track an individual’s location within the most protected area 
under the Fourth Amendment—the four walls of the home.299  The 
need for a well-established probable cause burden prior to the use of 
cell-simulation technology is supported by the Department of Justice’s 
own internal policy enhancements,300 and is the only way to ensure a 
minimum level of protection of individual privacy rights that the 
Fourth Amendment serves to guarantee. 
 
297 Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, supra 
note 158 (indicating the Department of Justice’s own concern that data handling and 
destruction were a concern with the use of cell-site simulators). 
298 See Browne, supra note 2, at 86-87 (contrasting the transmission of cell-site data from a 
cellular telephone to a cell-site simulator with the affirmative action required to purposefully 
make information available to the public, such as with “information written on the exterior of 
a package sent through the mail” or “statements made to undercover police officers”). 
299 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001). 
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